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ficient to protect the bank because the 
policy did not address sexual harassment. 
The policy therefore failed to notify em-
ployees of the employer's interest in avoid-
ing that form of discrimination. Second, 
the mere existence of a grievance procedure 
within the bank was insufficient to protect 
the bank against liability because the pro-
cedure required an employee to complain 
to her supervisor first. In this case, the 
employee would have had to complain to 
the alleged perpetrator, which she under-
standably failed to do. The Court left the 
door open regarding the rulings on em-
ployer's liability in the future. It even sug-
gested that if the employer's "procedures 
were better calculated to encourage victims 
of harassment to come forward" the em-
ployer may be able to avoid liability. ld. 
at 2409. 
Justice Marshall delivered the concur-
ring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Stevens. They agreed that 
workplace sexual harassment is illegal and 
violates Title VII. As regards employer 
liability, however, the justices concluded 
that "sexual harassment by a supervisor of 
an employee under his supervision, lead-
ing to a discriminatory work environment, 
should be imputed to the employer for 
Title VII purposes, regardless of whether 
the employee gave 'notice' of the offense." 
ld. at 2411. 
Based on the Court's holding there may 
be problems in the future concerning proof 
of whether conduct was "unwelcome" or 
"voluntary." Also, the issue of employer 
liability in sexual harassment cases has 
been left open, although the Court has 
indicated that future cases should apply 
agency principles. 
-Libby C. Reamer 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser: FIRST AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT PREVENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
FROM DISCIPLINING STUDENT 
FOR GIVING OFFENSIVELY LEWD 
AND INDECENT SPEECH 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 
(1969), the Supreme Court of the United 
States acknowledged that students do not 
"shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." ld. at 506. Recently, however, 
the Court held that a school district acted 
entirely within its permissible authority in 
imposing sanctions upon a high school 
student in response to the student's offen-
sively lewd and indecent speech given at a 
school assembly. The Court held that such 
speech was not protected by the first amend-
ment. Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986). 
Matthew Fraser was a high school stu-
dent in Bethel, Washington. At a school 
assembly attended by about 600 students, 
many of whom were 14 years of age, Fraser 
delivered a speech in support of a candi-
date for student government office. The 
speech referred to the candidate in terms 
of explicit sexual metaphors, employing 
such phrases as "he's firm in his pants ... 
his character is firm," "a man who takes his 
point and pounds it in," and "a man who 
will go to the very end - even the climax, 
for each and every one of you." ld. at 3167. 
Students at the assembly hooted and yelled 
during the speech, mimicking the sexual ac-
tivities alluded to in the speech, while 
others appeared to be shocked and embar-
rassed. Prior to Fraser's delivery of the 
speech, two of his teachers with whom he 
had discussed the contents of his speech 
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in advance, advised him that it was inap-
propriate and should not be given. 
The day after he delivered the speech, 
Fraser was asked to report to the assistant 
principal's office. At the meeting, Fraser 
was given notice that he was being charged 
with violating the school's disruptive con-
duct rule, which prohibited conduct that 
substantially interfered with the educa-
tional process, including the use of ob-
scene, profane language or gestures. After 
being given an opportunity to explain his 
conduct, in which he admitted that he de-
libenitely used sexual innuendos in the 
speech, Fraser was suspended for three 
days. In addition, he was informed that his 
name would be removed from a list of can-
didates on a ballot for graduation speakers. 
Fraser initiated a grievance of the disci-
plinary action through the school dis-
trict's grievance procedures. The hearing 
officer affirmed the decision but Fraser 
was allowed to return to school after serv-
ing only two days of his suspension. Fraser, 
joined by his father as guardian ad litem, 
then filed a civil rights action in federal 
district court, seeking injunctive relief 
and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. The district court, holding that 
the sanctions violated the student's rights 
under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, awarded Fraser monetary damages 
and enjoined the school district from pre-
venting him from speaking at graduation. 
Fraser was elected graduation speaker and 
spoke at the commencement ceremonies. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court judgment, rejecting the argument 
that the nomination speech had a disrup-
tive effect on the educational process. The 
court also rejected the argument that the 
school district had an interest in protecting 
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students, most of whom were minors, 
from lewd and indecent language in a 
school-sponsored setting. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed. Chief Justice Burger, speaking 
for the majority, distinguished Tinker as 
markedly different from the facts in this 
case. Specifically, that the penalties im-
posed on Fraser were unrelated to any 
political viewpoint. Moreover, the Chief 
Justice emphasized that "[i]n upholding 
the student's right to engage in a nondis-
ruptive, passive expression of a political 
viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful 
to note that the case 'did not concern speech 
or action that intrudes upon the work of 
the schools or the rights of other students." 
106 S.Ct. at 3163. It was against this back-
ground that the Court considered the level 
of First Amendment protection accorded 
to Fraser's nomination speech. 
The Court first discussed the role and 
purpose of the American public school 
system. The Court stated that the objec-
tives of public education were to inculcate 
"fundamental values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system." 
Id. at 3164, (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979». Conceding 
that these "fundamental values" included 
tolerance of unpopular views, both politi-
cal and religious, the Court determined 
that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advo-
cate unpopular and controversial views in 
schools and classrooms must be balanced 
against society's countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior." Id. at 3164. More-
over, the Court declared that while the 
first amendment guarantees adults wide 
protection in matters of public verbal ex-
pression, it does not follow that because 
adults are not prohibited from using offen-
sive forms of expression when making a 
political point, that children in a public 
school must be given the same latitude. 
Secondly, the Court expressed unequiv-
ocally that one of the functions of public 
school education is "to prohibit the use of 
vulgar and offensive terms in public dis-
course." Id. at 3165. The Court reasoned 
that the "fundamental values necessary to 
the maintenance of a democratic political 
system" discourage the use of highly offen-
sive terms. Furthermore, the Court indi-
cated that the Constitution is void of any 
language which prohibits the states from 
deciding that certain expressions are inap-
propriate and subject to sanctions. Realiz-
ing that the inculcation of these funda-
mental values are truly the responsibility 
of the schools, the Court left the deter-
mination of what speech was appropriate 
in the classroom or assembly to the school 
board. 
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The Court then turned its attention to 
frrstamendmentjurisprudencecon~g 
limitations on free speech where the speech 
is sexually explicit and reaches an unlim-
ited audience, especially an audience in-
cluding children. The Court acknowledged 
that these cases recognize a concerned in-
terest on the part of parents and school 
authorities "to protect children - especially 
those in a captive audience-from exposure 
to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd 
speech." Id.; See Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Board of Education 
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In addition, 
the Court cited cases which recognize an 
interest "in protecting minors from ex-
posure to vulgar and offensive spoken lan-
guage." 106 S.Ct. at 3165; See FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
Thus, the Court concluded that the first 
amendment did not prevent the school 
district from suspending Fraser in re-
sponse to his offensively lewd' and inde-
cent speech, and further concluded that to 
permit such a speech would "undermine 
the school's basic educational mission." 
106 S.Ct. at 3166. Remarking that "[a] 
high school assembly or classroom is no 
place for a sexually explicit monologue di-
rected towards an unsuspecting audience 
of teenage students," the Chief Justice con-
cluded that "it was perfectly appropriate 
for the school to disassociate itself to make 
the point to the pupils that vulgar speech 
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent 
with the 'fundamental values' of public 
school education." Id. 
The Court's holding in Fraser danger-
ously limits a high school student's first 
amendment right to free speech. Giving 
school officials the unbridled discretion to 
apply the nebulous standard of"indecency" 
in controlling the speech of high school 
students, certainly increases the risk of 
cementing white, middle-class standards 
for determining what is acceptable and 
proper speech and behavior in the public 
schools. Language considered "indecent" 
in one segment of society may be common, 
household usage in another. Freedom to 
be different in one's individual manner of 
expression is a core constitutional value. 
The first amendment reflects the consid-
ered judgment of the Founding Fathers 
that government shall not be permitted to 
use their power to control individual self-
expression. 
Finally, the Court characterizes Matthew 
Fraser as a "confused boy" whose "lewd, 
indecent, and offensive" speech could be 
"seriously damaging to its less mature au-
dience, many of whom were only 14 years 
old and on the threshold of awareness of 
human sexuality." 106 S.Ct. at 3165. The 
Supreme Court obviously fails to consider 
the everyday environment that these stu-
dents live in. Fraser was speaking not to 
children, but to young adults. Most high 
school students are beyond the point of 
being sheltered from the many sights and 
sounds they encounter everyday. Although 
school officials and parents may be of-
fended by certain utterances and actions, 
high school students, as young adults, 
should be able to determine for themselves 
whether such conduct is inappropriate and 
whether it should be disciplined. 
-Steven M. Schrier 
Falwell v. Flynt: NEW YORK TIMES 
"ACTUAL MALICE" STANDARD 
DISTINGUISHED IN ACTION FOR 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In Falwell v. Flynt, Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., __ 
F.2d __ (4th Cir. 1986), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that the level of protection 
available to a publisher in a suit by a public 
figure for emotional distress arising from a 
false publication is met by the recklessness 
standard of the tort itse1£ The court further 
held that a New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), .analysis is not re-
quired. In so holding, the court affirmed 
the decision by the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia. 
In Falwell, the lawsuit arose out of an "ad 
parody" that appeared in Hustler maga-
zine, which attempted to satirize an adver-
tising campaign for Campari Liqueur. In 
the actual Campari advertisements, celeb-
Fities talk about their "first time," meaning 
their fust encounter with Campari Liqueur, 
but there is a double entendre with a sex-
ual connotation. In the Falwell parody, he 
is the celebrity in the advertisement which 
contains his photograph and an interview 
which is attributed to him. In this inter-
view, Falwell allegedly details an incestu-
ous rendezvous with his mother in an out-
house in Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell's 
mother is portrayed as a drunken and im-
moral woman and he is portrayed as a 
hypocrite and a habitual drunkard. Fal-
well filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia 
alleging three theories ofliability: libel, in-
vasion of privacy under Va. Code § 8.01-40 
(1984), and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The district court dismissed 
Falwell's invasion of privacy claim and the 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants 
on the libel claim, finding that no reason-
able man would believe that the parody 
was describing actual facts about Falwell. 
On the emotional distress claim, the jury 
